not excluded. Hence, it is important to differentiate philosophy from rhetorical practices or sophism.
Socrates also faced this difficulty and many examples of this kind appear in Plato's dialogues. Badiou, referring to Plato, wrote a dialogue inspired by his Republic (Badiou 2010a) , where he describes how to escape a sophist constantly refuting new ideas. One has to defeat the sophist using the same rhetorical means. Only then will there be a space left to define and affirm a new conception. The sophist is then the representative and the speaker of the present situation and is subjugated by the objects and the people who are in power. Only in this way can the conditions of the battle be reversed in favour of one's own side.
Here we have grasped another aspect of the philosophical position, i.e. distance from the laws of power. Power transforms discussion in its own field, where it has its own rules. Socrates, philosopher par excellence, who was accused of corrupting the young, occupied this position perfectly. The young, in particular, who are becoming part of society and with whom Socrates met and conversed, therefore probably represent the group that philosophy can influence the most. In confronting power, Socrates ended up badly, and through his admittance of the rules, he acquiesced with the sentence.
What is the philosopher "fighting" for then and what assurance does he have of the rightness of his philosophical standpoint? He is not an ethicist, for his contributions and ideas are not concentrated on action, and even more importantly, his ideas lie outside the specified framework of action. The philosopher is not a politician. After all Socrates did not want to change the city, but to open up new horizons of thinking though his questions and doubts. Badiou states in his lecture: "Politics aims at the transformation of collective situations, while philosophy seeks to propose new problems for everyone" (Badiou 2009 ). So the ambition of philosophy is then to show a completely new point of view.
As Žižek continues in his contribution, the role of the philosopher is to change the whole approach of the current debate. For instance, there is currently a debate on how we should respond and what we should do when traditional values dissipate and the only motivation that people still have is-enjoyment. The conservative perspective inclines towards a return to fixed values, while the other, that considers every moral attitude to be a kind of repression, prefers to adapt to particular situations and decide in accordance with them. In well-known debates, where there are two opposing opinions, should the intervention of the philosopher be something more than just supporting one side. Re-formulating of a problem means to ask: is this really the question? Is the act of guiding human action in Western culture today simply a form of hedonism?
It seems that people are acting also by society's imperatives to live a healthy life. Besides the widespread consumption of fast-food, there are now more people than ever before going jogging, spending time in the gym and going on a diet. Seemingly sexually promiscuous, liberal society in the USA is accompanied everywhere by warnings of sexual harassment. So, this cannot be a society in which all restraint has vanished. Popular examples of this are prevalent, well-known commodities such as alcohol-free beer, or sugar-free coca-cola. It seems that the pleasure is measured, rearranged and the people are acting upon some trends. Discipline is embodied into the things themselves and into enjoyment. The role of the philosopher then is to draw attention to new problems that arise. He does not have to argue in favour of one, because that is what politicians, political scientists or lobbyists do. He changes the perspective. In this sense it can be said that Nietzsche was the one who understood that point, who focused on perspectives. However, we should be careful here. The fact that our statements also issue from a specific position is also a philosophical problem, which had to be invented and focused on. But here we come back to the sophists, whom we silenced a while ago, to be able to define something new on our own. Does this mean that we are getting caught up, moving in some kind of philosophical circle? What does Badiou mean in terms of philosophy?
Badiou quotes from one of his favorite poets, Saint-John Perse, who in one of his poems writes this about a stranger:
The Stranger, clothed in his new thoughts, acquires still more partisans in the ways of silence (Badiou 2009). Who is this stranger? According to Badiou, it is philosophical commitment. The philosopher always comes up with something new and also focuses attention on this new viewpoint. It is important to note that he is affirming this new perspective and not rejecting it as something commonplace or well known. He is thus emphasizing a certain viewpoint and making it universal. Hence, this "universal" is basically "anobjective". This means that this viewpoint accepts that there are more, different standpoints, but that this new one, grounded on the affirmation of something new, is presented as a universal problem concerning everybody. After all, we can find this affirmation act of the new by Nietzsche in the form of life-affirmation (Deleuze 2004).
Badiou focused on the universal in his book Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Badiou 2010b ) for example. In this example we see that what constitutes the universal and what is related to it is not society but the subject directly. At the beginning it appears in particular thoughts, which then recollect in the universal acting generally and eternally. The universal is defining itself according to the given, places itself above it and establishes the new. It is like the intervention of love, which emerges between two people. They may have known each other before, even had their own ties, but once one of them says "I love you", everything changes. To say this, an exact situation has to be present, to allow this to occur. The universal cannot then be founded just anywhere, because it would lack its own extraordinary meaning, i.e. the founding act which changes everything that existed before into its image. Without an event, the universal cannot be grounded, because it would not be elaborated on, or it would soon be discredited, and it would stay the same until then. The position of the event is hence uneasy to define, because it is present in the situation, but also not. Even when the event disappears, and this "I love you" from the example dies away, the lovers as the subjects stay faithful to it.
Badiou provides the following historical examples of faithfulness to the event: Paul's faith in the resurrection of Christ and the faithfulness of the Bolsheviks to the Russian revolution. These are acts which completely inverted the course of history and decided the "eventual", undecidable statements. Badiou in his book about Saint Paul illustrates the way in which during his time Paul decided that for God particularities such as nationality (Greek, Roman…) or sex are unimportant and therefore everybody is (compared to God) just a human being. For example, Jews were forbidden to dine with non-Jews. Paul's adherence to the event, through which he influenced many others left an impact on customs. Despite the fact that some of the strong traditionalists did not want this to be the case.
The relation between the universal and the subject is founded in subtracting the particular, descriptive predicates, leaving only singularities, between which there are no remaining obstacles, which could hinder the emergence and broadening of the universal. Specific particularities (Greek, Jewish, female, male…) make differences between particular singularities, shading their affinity and breaking the universal. From this it is clear that the universal can be established only by an intellectual operation of the established subject.
A current example of the undecidability of these problems is the status of the illegal immigrant. The immigrant's path to singularity is blocked by the particularities of nationality, citizenship and by residence permits. In today's France, there are two viewpoints to illegal immigrants: they belong here, because they live here and work here; they do not belong here, because they do not have the papers prove to prove it. The subject deciding this situation, as the agent faithful to the event establishing the universal, can emerge only in this space of present knowledge, i.e. where the objective knowledge is missing or is not clear.
If we return back to philosophy that is related with the "incommensurable, radical choice, distance or exception", which means it is concerned with the "third" answer that is solving the wrong positions in falsely asked questions. Philosophy chooses, i.e. it is founding, Truth against power, a confrontation of the incommensurable against discussion (Socrates against Callicles in Plato's Gorgias), the new (problems, views) against the old.
In response, Slavoj Žižek, Badiou's contemporary, asks what is the position of this philosophy today, when every other experience with new perspectives has been rejected as dangerous?
Let us consider the situation in relation to examples given by recent philosophers. It seems that the possibility of asserting one's own "truth" is blocked today by the philosophical concepts themselves. How can we induce confrontations to the Lévinasian Other if the whole of infinity lies between them? Or take Derrida, who, instead of radically thinking about the other in his book Spectres of Marx, lists 10 disasters which the world is facing today. Žižek, originally an enthusiastic proponent of deconstructivism, was very surprised, as he read it. And what about Habermas, who has become a "state philosopher", and who, together with Pope Ratzinger, is considering the epochal impact of biogenetics with fear that something really might change? (Žižek also mentions this in his interview "Humanism is not enough.") (Hauser 2008) . Is it not the case that these philosophies of "encountering the other" seem to be suspiciously too careful, or to resemble an attempt to get away from what is really different?
Is this the philosopher's reaction to liberal capitalism, which is "almost perfect" in some respects, but that cannot really be criticized? Where is the philosophical ability to see things from a distance, to look at things from a different point of view? As Descartes described how when on the road his own country customs started to look strange to him. Does this mean that our present era has somehow philosophically weakened?
There is not enough fundamental criticism of the present day era, probably because we have democracy. Richard Rorty described this perfectly: "democracy is after all more important than philosophy" (Badiou 2009 ). Žižek is considering this statement because they are after all both contemporaries in philosophy and one should never stop at one point without questioning further. However, is democracy the last and dauntless horizon of thinking? Does democracy protect us from the threats we wish to escape the most?
If we do not question more, then we do not examine the present character of democracy further, not its effects nor its responses. Again, we have to approach the thing from a distance, in order to see that the problem is not a naïve question: should we have democracy or not? Although it may play a significant role in opening up a space for freedom, it can also become the golden calf before which we must kneel without question, which also is a limit to freedom. After all democracy was widespread in the twentieth century, but helped Nazism and fascism to ascend to power all the same.
What is hidden behind democracy today? A politician or a party receives a mandate from the people through parliamentary elections, but the voters do not approve of all (sometimes only very little) that they enshrine in law. How can we prevent this from happening, if everybody respects the election results, disregarding their process? Žižek mentions here the very important and controversial USA presidential elections of 2000, where the result was not clear until the last moment. In the end it was decided that the results were very close and according to many observers the recount of votes from the last district was not transparent.
What kind of election is it, asks Badiou, where there are always two wings with profiled voters on each side, yet it is the remaining electorate, the undecided voter, that decides? How is it that there is such a large number of people who are not sufficiently informed or who do not vote at all? How is it that the media image has such an impact on voters, regardless of the party manifesto or the politics of the candidates?
At first sight, these radical questions point deeper than is necessary. How can radical criticism be possible in the end, when it is prevented by the distorted mirror of democracy? Should democracy not be the target of serious and substantial criticism today?
What could philosophy do in this case, when these two philosophers consider these issues in terms of philosophy? Philosophy is, simply put, a radical choice, or in other words, a revolution, and not only in thinking. During the days of the French Revolution in Germany the philosophy of German idealism thrived. Hegel referred to this philosophy as another form of revolution. It seems that you cannot have both of them in one place together. One could say that philosophy is also an intervention in a paradoxical situation. What change or revolution would we prefer?
